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ABSTRACT 
The events of 11 September 2001 were a watershed moment in American history; 
one that has catapulted national security back to the center stage.  In response to the 
growing fears of terrorism and the heightened concern for illegal immigration that 
subsequently followed, President Bush signed the Secure Fence Act in October 2006, 
thus entangling two very distinct issues: counterterrorism, and illegal immigration.  The 
legislation authorized the construction of 700 hundred miles of double-layered fencing in 
addition to cameras, ground radar and improved lighting along the U.S.-Mexican border.  
The proposed border fence was designed to prevent “unlawful entry into the United 
States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens and instruments of terrorism.”  
This thesis examines the probable effectiveness of the border fence on illegal 
immigration and counterterrorism, by analyzing other such structures in the context of 
these two very different phenomena.  This study investigates the border fence in San 
Diego, California and its affect on illegal immigration in addition to the security fence 
along Israel’s border with Gaza to explore its effect on terrorism.  The study suggests that 
fences can prove effective in curbing illegal immigration but are less successful in 
combating terrorism. 
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I. THE SECURE FENCE ACT: THE EXPECTED IMPACT ON 
 ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the days following September 11, 2001, U.S. public attention on 
counterterrorism and illegal immigration increased dramatically.  The government’s 
perceived lax attitude toward border security led to wide-spread concern.  While most 
Americans were not worried about suicide bombers along their southern border, they 
were concerned with clandestine transnational actors that “evade law enforcement 
efforts…to potentially carry out religiously inspired acts of violence.”1  In response to 
new threats to border security, President George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act in 
October 2006.2  The legislation authorized the construction of 700 hundred miles of 
double-layered fencing in addition to cameras, ground radar and improved lighting along 
the U.S.-Mexico border.3  The proposed border fence was designed to prevent “unlawful 
entry into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens and 
instruments of terrorism.”4  The Secure Fence Act thus entangled two very distinct 
issues: counterterrorism and illegal immigration.  Critics have questioned the 
effectiveness of such a fence on the U.S.-Mexico border in addressing these perceived 
threats.  This thesis will examine the probable effectiveness of the border fence on illegal 
immigration and counterterrorism. 
                                                 
1  Peter Andreas, "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century," 
International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003), 78. 
2  Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public Law Public Law 109-367-October 26, 2006, Sec. 2. 
3  Richard Marosi, "Border Fence nearly Doubles; After Reporting Sluggish Progress Last Month, U.S. 
Officials Announce the Stretch of Barriers has Grown to 145 Miles." Los Angeles Times, September 29, 
2007. 
4  Secure Fence Act of 2006, Sec. 2-Sec. 3. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
It is essential for officials in government to evaluate and analyze the effectiveness 
of these types of measures.  Given the enormous costs associated with the proposed 
border fence, it is important to consider the long-term impact on illegal immigration and 
counterterrorism.  If history is any indicator, the United States will continue to attract 
illegal immigrants and remain the target of terrorism.  Consequently, government leaders 
have a responsibility to safeguard our borders and protect the American public from acts 
of terror using the most efficacious instruments available.  The objective of this study is 
to resolve the on-going debate between the proponents and opponents of the U.S. border 
fence by developing an empirical analysis of its likely impact on immigration and 
terrorism. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This study has two arguments.  The first is that it is very likely that the new 
border fence, with the appropriate staffing of USBP personnel, will have a significant 
impact on illegal border-crossings.  The analysis in chapter two suggests that the 
proposed border fence will be a robust deterrent and will discourage many from 
attempting illegal entry.  The second argument is that the border fence is unlikely to 
prevent acts of terror within the continental United States.  Terrorists are highly adaptive 
and are capable of overcoming even the most complex barriers systems.  The analysis in 
chapter three suggests that terrorists can skillfully exploit vulnerabilities to their 
advantage in an effort to marginalize the security effect of the fence.    
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are two schools of thought regarding the likely effects of the border fence 
on illegal immigration and counterterrorism.  The first argues that the border fence is 
likely to have a significant impact on reducing the flow of both illegal immigrants and 
terrorists into the United States from Mexico.  Paul Staniland, addressing strategies to 
combat transnational insurgencies, asserts that the first priority is to build and maintain 
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defensive barriers, including the border fence.5  “Isolating the insurgents’ men and 
materiel from the primary arena of warfare reduces their ability to make military and 
political gains, cutting off insurgent’s contact with and assistance from external 
sanctuaries and diasporas.”6  He is not alone in this view.  Jonathyn Rynhold, of Bar Ilan 
University, also advocates the utility of security fences.  Discussing the security fence 
between Israel and the West Bank, he acknowledges that the “security barrier is hardly an 
optimal strategy,” but concludes that the “barrier could turn out to be the best means 
available for managing a deadly conflict.”7  Scholars in this camp point to the results of 
two such barrier systems.  The first was erected in San Diego, California in 1990 to 
reduce the flow of illegal immigrants from Mexico into the United States.8  The fence 
originally ran 14 miles in length and consisted of a single primary fence.9  It was later 
reinforced with a secondary fence and better resourced in terms of personnel and 
equipment.  Where deployed, the fence reduced the number of captured illegal 
immigrants from 361,125 persons in FY 1992 to 19,035 persons in FY 2004.  The second 
example is Israel’s security fence along the Gaza Strip.  In April 2004, David Makovsky 
wrote “since early 200l, not a single successful Palestinian suicide bomber has infiltrated 
Israel from Gaza, and mortar shells fired from within the territory have failed to kill any 
Israelis.”10  According to him:  
A properly constructed fence could achieve multiple objectives: reduce 
violence by limiting the infiltration of suicide bombers into Israel, short-
circuit the deadlock on achieving a two-state solution, advance the debate 
in Israel about the future of most settlements, and perhaps even provide an 
incentive for Palestinians to return to the negotiating table. Even without 
                                                 
5  Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence," The 
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 31. 
6  Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence," The 
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 31. 
7  Jonathan Rynhold, "Israel's Fence: Can Separation make Better Neighbors?" Survival 46, no. 1 
(Spring 2004), 72. 
8  Blas Nunez-Neto and Stephen Vina, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, [2006]). 
9  Ibid. 
10  David Makovsky, "How to Build a Fence," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), 52. 
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negotiation, the fence would function as a provisional border and could be 
modified in the future if Palestinians make real progress in halting 
terrorism against Israel and agree to restart talks.11 
The second school of thought argues that the fence will not make a discernable 
contribution to combating illegal immigration or counterterrorism.  Scholars in this camp 
argue that “it should not be immediately assumed that the newest and most advanced 
technologies—the highest wall, the most sensitive surveillance—will best protect society 
from terrorist attack.”12  Tony Payan argues that the U.S. has pumped billions of dollars 
into fortifying the borders with little success and that these strategies are inadequate to 
deal with the complex challenges of illegal immigration.13  Brian Jackson asks: “If 
migrants and smugglers respond to border fencing and surveillance by regularly 
damaging the fence and its associated systems, how will a constant stream of repair 
efforts affect DHS’s security efforts?”14  This group suggests that vulnerabilities can be 
identified and quickly exploited, minimizing the impact of the fence.  In the case of 
illegal immigration, they argue that while the number of apprehensions was sharply 
reduced in the San Diego area, the number of apprehensions to the east of the fence 
skyrocketed, indicating a significant net increase in illegal immigration.  As the number 
of illegal immigrants captured in San Diego dropped by about 300,000, the number 
captured at the border in the Tucson region grew from 71,036 persons in FY 1992 to 
490,827 persons in FY 2004.15  This suggests that illegal immigrants simply went around 
the fence—following the path of least resistance, which in this case was through the 
Tucson area.  This camp argues that terrorists will follow a similar path of least 
resistance, and thus the fence will not make a significant contribution to counterterrorism 
                                                 
11  David Makovsky, "How to Build a Fence," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), 52 
12  Brian A. Jackson, Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome 
Defensive Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Homeland Security, 2007), 10. 
13  Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006), 122. 
14  House of Representatives Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Developing Robust 
Border Security Technologies to Protect Against Diverse and Adaptive Threats, 2007, 10, 
http://rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT294.pdf (accessed March 15, 2008). 
15  Nunez-Neto and Vina, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border, 38. 
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efforts.  These conclusions are based on analysis of Israel.  They suggest that 
counterterrorism measures such as the Gaza fence will be met with innovative tactics that 
seek to minimize its intended effects.16  In other words, terrorist will substitute their old 
tactics for new tactics that exploit vulnerabilities elsewhere.  This lesson can be applied 
to U.S.-Mexico border as well; potential terrorists operating in that region could simply 
change their tactics and nullify the perceived benefits of the border fence.  In addition, 
critics argue that terrorists will simply enter legally and/or be recruited within the United 
States—side-stepping the border entry problems—or simply enter from Canada or an 
unfenced portion of the US-Mexico border.17  In short, the fence—stretching only 700 of 
the nearly 2,000 miles—can be too easily avoided, cut or climbed, rendering it 
ineffective.18  Terrorists can adapt far quicker than the U.S. can build and reinforce the 
fence. 
Both schools of thought assert that the impact of the fence will be the same for 
immigration and terrorism.  This thesis challenges this, arguing that because the 
motivations and level of commitment of immigrants and terrorists are different, the 
impact of the fence is likely to be different for the two groups.  This study will enhance 
the granularity on the subject of border fences by examining how they affect the 
calculations of migrant workers and terrorists differently.  I will argue that the proposed 
border fence is likely to be effective with regard to illegal immigration but have a 
negligible impact to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, using indirect evidence from the 
border fence in San Diego and the Gaza fence from Israel. 
                                                 
16  Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "What do we know about the Substitution Effect in Transnational 
Terrorism?" Alabama, California, 2002), http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~tsandler/substitution2ms.pdf (accessed 
Oct 7, 2008). 
17  "Border Fence Called Impractical; Experts Say Illegal Immigrants Will Enter Elsewhere," The 
Washington Post, October 3, 2006. 
18  Jackson, Developing Robust Border Security Technologies to Protect Against Diverse and Adaptive 
Threats, 6. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will utilize process tracing, deductive analysis and the comparative 
study method.  Two existing fences were selected for study based on their objectives: one 
to deter peaceful illegal immigrants and one to deter aggressive terrorist.  The San Diego 
fence is an important starting point for this discussion.  It provides an historical anchor 
point that will enable a greater understanding of the U.S.-Mexico border, and what effects 
the proposed border fence is likely to have based on historical experience.  The Gaza 
fence is better suited to a study of the likely impact of the U.S.-Mexico fence on terrorism 
because of the higher rate of terrorists there.  These examples are somewhat polarized, 
each emphasizing a different objective, enabling a more thorough analysis of the 
material.  The thesis relies heavily on sources from the governments of the United States 
and Israel, pertaining to illegal immigration, terrorism, border security and security 
fences, as well as the secondary literature.  The next chapter discusses the effectiveness 
of the San Diego fence in reducing illegal immigration, and chapter three discusses the 
effect of fences on terrorism more deductively, using evidence from the Gaza fence in 
Israel as illustration.  The final chapter brings together the insights from chapters two and 
three, and to attempt to project the most likely results of the new U.S. border fence. 
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II. SAN DIEGO: FENCES, BORDER AGENTS AND ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Well designed and constructed fences should have some deterrent effect on illegal 
immigration.  But a determined migrant can climb over or cut through a fence, so the 
deterrent is never absolute, and sometimes not even significant.  A fence is a passive 
measure, which cannot anticipate or react.  It cannot make an arrest or alert authorities to 
trouble.  These are the responsibilities of border agents and the advanced technology they 
employ.  Thus any assessment of the extent to which border fencing deters illegal 
immigration must take into account both the fence itself and the human and technological 
supports that can operate with or without a fence.  This chapter will examine the 
effectiveness of new security measures deployed within the San Diego sector of the U.S.-
Mexico border between 1992 and 2004.  These measures included erecting fences, 
installing stadium style lighting and advanced sensors, and changing the staffing levels of 
U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) personnel.  The vast majority of the border is desolate, 
marked by rugged terrain and extreme climate conditions.  It stretches nearly 2,000 miles, 
and spans four states: California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas.  These states are then 
divided into 9 border sectors (Figure 1).19  The sectors vary in size and topography, and 
are policed by a varying number of border agents.  Despite being the smallest, the San 
Diego sector was far and away the busiest in terms of arrests of illegal immigrants in the 
early 1990s, with nearly half of all apprehensions along the entire southwestern (SW) 
border occurring there.  However, there was a fairly sudden and dramatic decline in San 
Diego’s share of apprehensions in the mid-1990s, falling from 40+% in 1993-1995 to 
32% in 1996, 21% in 1997, and then settling around 12% after 1998.   This suggests that 
 
 
                                                 
19  Richard M. Stana, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying Lessons 
Learned to Future Projects (Washington D.C.: Government Accounting Office, [2008]). 
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some or all of the new security measures were effective.  However, a more micro level 
analysis is needed to determine which measure or measures were responsible for the 
reduction in illegal immigration, and why. 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Border Patrol Sectors Along the Southwest Border20 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on the number of illegal migrants that 
successfully enter the United States in a given year.  Thus, it is not possible to measure 
illegal immigration directly.  Instead, this study uses apprehension data obtained from the 
USBP to measure the level of illegal immigration indirectly.  Apprehensions are simply 
the number of arrests made by border agents of aliens attempting illegal entry into the 
United States.  Illegal aliens have been known to make multiple attempts to cross the 
border; therefore these statistics reflect the number of arrests, not necessarily the number 
of persons.21  Since the number of persons attempting to cross the border illegally is 
unknown, we cannot calculate the success rate of security measures.  For instance, if 
USBP personnel captured 100 out of 1,000 known persons to have attempted to cross the 
border illegally, they would have achieved a 10% success rate.  But since the total 
                                                 
20  From Richard M. Stana, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying 
Lessons Learned to Future Projects (Washington D.C.: Government Accounting Office, [2008]). 
21  Blas Nunez-Neto and Yule Kim, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, [2008]). 
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number attempting to cross is unknown, we can only track trends in apprehensions.  An 
increase in apprehensions could indicate larger flows of illegal immigrants and a fixed 
success rate, or it could indicate a fixed flow of illegal immigrants and an increased 
success rate (e.g., due to the construction of a fence, an increase in personnel, and/or 
deployment of improved technology).  Conversely, a reduction in apprehensions could be 
also be interpreted in several ways. A drop in apprehensions might reflect the poor 
policies or practices of the USBP (e.g. failing to deploy their agents along high traffic 
routes).  A drop in apprehensions during a reduction in manning could infer that fewer 
agents are abducting fewer illegal immigrants.  Finally, it could also be interpreted as an 
indication of success.  For instance, if the number of apprehensions was falling while the 
number of agents was increasing, it would provide strong evidence that illegal migration 
has slowed or shifted elsewhere.  This, this study will interpret a drop in illegal 
immigration as an indication of success.  While apprehension data is a rough gauge of the 
level of illegal immigration, it remains the best available indicator and this analysis will 
therefore employ it cautiously to measure illegal immigration. 
This chapter draws upon reports produced by the Congressional Research Service 
as its primary data sources.22  Two of these reports focus on the San Diego fence, while 
the other discusses the larger role of U.S. Border Patrol.  All three reports provide 
government statistics regarding numbers of agents, numbers of apprehensions, barriers 
constructed and fiscal considerations toward border security strategies.  These reports 
conclude that fencing in San Diego successfully deterred illegal immigration, rerouting it 
to other sectors along the SW border based on comparisons of apprehension trends in 
unfenced and fenced areas.  However, the reports focus on border fences exclusively, 
failing to consider the effect of higher numbers of border agents and their technological 
arsenal, which increased significantly in the same period.  The following analysis 
disaggregates the independent effects of staffing increases and fencing on illegal 
                                                 
22 Unless otherwise stated, the information in this chapter comes from the following sources:  Blas 
Nunez-Neto and John Garcia Michael, Border Security: The San Diego Fence (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,[2007]); Nunez-Neto and Vina, Border Security: 
Barriers Along the U.S. International Border, 2; Blas Nunez-Neto, Border Security: The Role of the U.S. 
Border Patrol (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service,[2006]). 
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immigration in San Diego.  Specifically, it isolates the effects “human barriers” had on 
illegal immigration and then compares those results to the net outcome when a fence or 
barrier was added to the equation.  The next section studies the unfenced areas during this 
time, evaluating the effectiveness of border agents alone as their numbers rose and then 
fell over time.  The next section studies the fenced areas, evaluating the effectiveness of 
human and physical barriers combined.  Increased numbers of USBP personnel using 
improved technology and the border fence are each found to have significantly reduced 
illegal immigration on their own, and to have had a more dramatic effect in combination.  
Taken together, this suggests that the reduction in illegal immigration in the San Diego 
sector is attributable to both increased staffing and fence construction, with the most 
pronounced reduction occurring when and where both fencing and improved border 
patrol were in place.   
B. UNFENCED BORDER AREAS 
Between 1992 and 2004 78% of the border in the San Diego sector (52 of 66 
miles) was unfenced. The unfenced area was comprised of three border stations: El 
Cajon, Campo and Brown Field.  These stations abutted a sparsely populated Mexican 
landscape with rugged terrain and natural barriers such as mountains, deep ravines and 
desert.  It was therefore not conducive to fencing, given the difficult construction 
requirements and environmental challenges.  However, the rugged terrain itself provided 
USBP agents some advantage over illegal migrants. 
On October 1, 1994, the start of fiscal year 1995, the USBP commenced 
Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego sector.23  Phased in between October 1994 and 
June 1998, Gatekeeper increased personnel and equipment enormously.  In 1993 there 
were 992 border agents in the sector (Table 1).  That figure climbed to 1,290 agents the 
following year, a 30% increase.  Between 1994 and 1995 staffing levels increased 
another 12%.  In 1996 staffing levels grew by another 36%, and peaked in 1997 at 2,281.  
Beginning in 1998, manning declined incrementally, reaching 2,004 agents in 2001, and 
                                                 
23  Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" and the Making of the U.S.-
Mexico Boundary (New York: Routledge, 2002), 92. 
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then falling more sharply to 1,807 in 2002.  Staffing levels then increased to 1,972 agents 
in 2003, before abruptly dropping to 1,651 in 2004.  Between 1994 and 1998 the number 
of seismic sensors, used to detect illegal incursions along the border, increased by 171%, 
the number of vehicles increased by 152% to keep pace with the increased staffing levels, 
while helicopters increased from 6 to 10.  Finally, the number of infrared night-vision 
goggles (NVGs) increased from 12 to 49, providing border agents an improved ability to 
detect intruders during periods of darkness.  Advancements in technology can make 
important contributions to law enforcement agencies such as the USBP.  Equipment such 
as seismic sensors and night vision goggles—in the hands of a trained agent—enable 
improved indications and warnings (I&W) of potential interlopers.  Obviously, a border 
agent equipped with NVGs during night time operations stands a much better chance of 
detecting an intruder than an agent depending on his or her eyesight alone.  Likewise an 
advanced sensor, such as seismic equipment, can provide enhanced I&W.  While it 
cannot physically apprehend a suspect, it can signal authorities that the perimeter has 
been breached, the location of the incident, and the approximate numbers of intruders as 
well as the route of travel.  In this way, it has been characterized as a force multiplier—
enabling law enforcement officials to operate more precisely and efficiently.  Overall 
then, more agents with improved mobility and employing an enhanced arsenal of 
advanced technology were put in place.  Detailed data on staffing and technology 
disaggregated by fenced v. unfenced portions of the sector are not available, but the 
USBP reports that staffing and technology changes were implemented evenly across the 
sector.24 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
992 1290 1433 1,965 2,281 2,274 2,136 2,053 2,004 1,807 1,972 1,651 
Table 1.   Authorized USBP Personnel in San Diego Sector, 1993-200425 
                                                 
24 Agents were deployed in a 3-tier, layered defense.  The first tier of agents was assigned at fixed 
locations along the border.  These agents were in charge of apprehending suspects and preventing entry 
across the border.  The second tier was deployed to heavily traveled corridors used by illegal aliens.  The 
third tier was highly mobile and manned vehicle checkpoints inland to apprehend aliens who managed to 
get through the first two tiers. 
25  After Jason Ciliberti, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent, Authorized USBP Personnel on SW Border 
By Sector and Fiscal Year, Aug 13, 2008. 
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In 1994, when the number of border patrol agents increased by 30%, 
apprehensions fell by 27%.  If the flow of illegal immigrants and the efficiency of each 
border patrol agent had remained constant, one would expect apprehensions to have 
increased with the additional agents on the ground.  The fact that apprehension fell thus 
suggests a reduction in the number of aliens attempting to cross the border illegally, since 
there is no logical reason to think that more and better equipped agents would have 
become less efficient.  However, we cannot conclude that the increased border patrol 
acted as an effective deterrent in this year for two reasons.  First, apprehensions fell in six 
of the nine sectors of the border that year, suggesting that illegal immigration was down 
across the board for reasons unrelated to border policing.  Second, in 1995 and 1996 
apprehensions in unfenced areas of San Diego increased by 41% and 11%, respectively, 
suggesting that after smoothing out annual fluctuations arrests per agent remained largely 
stable through 1996 (Table 2).  This trend would indicate that the additional staffing and 
technology put in place between 1994 and 1996, notwithstanding the anomaly of 1994, 
did not present an immediate deterrent to illegal immigration.  
FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 
204,456 210,129 155,386 262,505 297,423 189,321 160,781 140,640 113,866 85,815 87,195 96,752 119,293 
Table 2.   Apprehensions in Unfenced Areas of the San Diego Sector, 1992-2004 
However, the evidence suggests that increased apprehensions resulting from 
increased staffing and technology at the unfenced portion of the border in 1995 and 1996 
did have an effect on the networks of illegal immigrants.  As more were caught, arrested 
and returned to Mexico, word-of-mouth feedback about the increased security 
discouraged illegal aliens from attempting entry through the unfenced portions of the San 
Diego sector.  As a result, in 1997 the number of apprehensions fell by a dramatic 36%, 
initiating a longer term trend of falling apprehensions.  Illegal migration began shifting 
away from the unfenced areas of the San Diego sector and toward the neighboring 
unfenced sector of El Centro, where there were only 249 border agents to patrol the 34 
miles of border, or 7 agents per mile compared to 34 agents per mile in San Diego.  The 
number of apprehensions in El Centro skyrocketed from 66,873 in 1996 to 146,210 in 
1997.  Thus, the 108,102 drop in apprehensions in unfenced San Diego was accompanied 
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by a 79,337 increase in apprehensions in El Centro, indicating that El Centro became the 
preferred entry point for nearly three quarters of the illegal immigrants that would have 
normally attempted entry through San Diego.  This evidence increases our confidence 
that illegal migration did indeed shift in response to an increased deterrent provided by 
higher levels of staffing and technology in unfenced San Diego. 
Between 1998 and 2001 the number of border patrol agents across the sector fell 
by 11% (270 agents), while apprehensions in unfenced areas dropped by nearly half 
(from 160,781 to 85,815).  This suggests that migration patterns continued to respond to 
more effective security, despite incremental reductions.26  As apprehensions declined in 
the sector, some border agents were marshaled to other priority areas, with approximately 
two thirds of the agents that were cut from San Diego during this time transferred to El 
Centro in response to shifting migration patterns, while keeping staffing in San Diego at a 
level that was sufficient to maintain the deterrent there.  However, between 2001 and 
2004 (the end of the period of analysis) staff levels fell more significantly, and 
apprehensions in unfenced San Diego began to increase as a result. Staffing in the sector 
averaged 1,815 in 2002-2004, down from 2,150 in 1997-2001, which seems to have 
encouraged illegal aliens to retest the security measures in the unfenced areas.  
In summary, after a lag of about three years during which illegal migrants became 
more aware of the increased security along the unfenced portion of the border in the San 
Diego sector, increasing staffing and technology provided a significantly increased 
deterrent to illegal migration, leading to a reduction from the high point in 1996 to the 
low point in 2001 of 71%, or 211,608 apprehensions per year.  Excluding the San Diego 
sector, apprehensions along the entire SW border in this five year period were up by 
10%, or 102,000 per year, suggesting that some illegal migrants shifted to other border 
areas, while others where deterred from crossing the border entirely.  This shows that 
even in the absence of a border fence, a robust cadre of border agents is a good deterrent 
to illegal immigration, at least in sparsely populated, rough-terrain areas.  Government 
                                                 
26 While critics might argue there were fewer apprehensions because there were fewer agents to police 
the border, this argument is too inconsistent with the trends during that period.  It is implausible that a 
phased reduction by 270 agents over a four-year period would account for this reduced level of arrests. 
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officials recognized the successes they achieved in San Diego and began incrementally 
transferring border agents to other high priority sectors between 1998 and 2004.  For a 
while this left the deterrent intact, but eventually staffing reductions became significant 
enough to weaken the deterrent and apprehensions began increasing again.  The deterrent 
was effective while the number of agents averaged 2,150 (33/mile), and became less 
effective when it averaged 1,815 (27/mile).27  The increase in apprehensions in the 
unfenced areas in 2004 may also have been attributable in part to the even greater 
deterrent then in place in the nearby fenced areas of San Diego, as the next section will 
show. 
C. FENCED BORDER AREAS 
The fenced areas of the San Diego sector at this time included two border stations: 
Imperial Beach and Chula Vista.  These stations were centered on the densely populated 
Tijuana/San Diego border, which by 1995 was home to a combined population of 3.2 
million.28  There are no natural terrain features to restrict illegal entry into those two 
areas, which fall on either side of the Ysidro Port of Entry, the busiest gateway into the 
United States.29  Before 1990, the U.S. border control strategy in this area focused on 
apprehending suspects after they crossed the border, which enabled those not being 
pursued by border agents to get away.30  One tactic frequently utilized by illegal aliens 
was for large groups—sometimes numbering in the thousands—to mass on the border 
and wait for nightfall.  They would then make a mad dash across the border and quickly 
blend into suburban areas (Figure 2).  Border agents would respond with a “man-on-man” 
                                                 
27 The US Border Patrol conducts 24-hour operations throughout the year.  Agents are therefore 
assigned to one of three eight-hour work shifts.  Since most illegal incursions occur at night, a higher 
percentage of agents are assigned to night-time operations.  In a notional scenario where there are 24 agents 
assigned per mile, half (12 agents) are assigned to night-time operations, while the other twelve agents are 
divided among the other two shifts, averaging 6 agents a piece.  This of course increases the distance that 
each agent is therefore expected to patrol. 
28  Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the "Illegal Alien" and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico 
Boundary, 80. 
29  Lisa M. Seghetti and others, Border Security and the Southwest Border: Background, Legislation, 
and Issues (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, [2005]). 
30  Border Control: Revised Strategy is Showing some Positive Results (Washington DC: Government 
Accounting Office,[1994]), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg9530.pdf (accessed 23 July 2008). 
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pursuit, apprehending an estimated average of 1 in 8 of those crossing the border.31  
Given the ineffectiveness of this strategy, it was determined that barriers were needed to 
assist law enforcement officials.  The fencing, referred to as primary fencing, consisted of 
sheets of heavy steel gauge matting used in the construction of temporary runways.  It 
was surplus war materiel installed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  San Diego was 
considered the epicenter of illegal immigration and therefore was the first sector to 
construct significant fencing.32  The fence formed the centerpiece of the U.S. Border 
Patrol’s strategy of “Prevention through Deterrence.” Construction on the fence began in 
1990 and was completed by 1993.  It measured 10 feet high, stretching 14 of the 66 miles 
of the border in that sector.  In addition to the new staff and technology described above, 
stadium-style lighting systems in the fenced areas were expanded from 1 mile to 6 miles 
of coverage.  This enhanced night time visibility for law enforcement officers and 
improved intruder detection along high-traffic areas.  
 
Figure 2.   Illegal Aliens Massing on Border33 
                                                 
31  Border Control: Revised Strategy is Showing some Positive Results (Washington DC: Government 
Accounting Office, [1994]), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg9530.pdf (accessed 23 July 2008). 
32  Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed 
(Washington DC: General Accounting Office,[1997]), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98021.pdf 
(accessed 31 July 2008). 
33  From Border Control: Revised Strategy is Showing some Positive Results, 9. 
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The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 authorized 
the construction of a secondary fence to parallel the primary fence.  Construction began 
in 1999 in accordance with design plans recommended by Sandia Laboratory.  The 
secondary fence utilized a finer weave than normal chain linked fences, denying potential 
climbers hand and toe holds.  The fence was angled toward the climber, making it even 
more difficult to scale (Figure 3).  A robust lighting system and interior all weather road 
were developed to facilitate vehicle pursuits of those who still managed to scale the 
fence.  The cumulative effect was to create a layered and robust barrier system.  Due to 
environmental concerns voiced by the California Coastal Commission, only 9 of the 14 
miles authorized by IIRIRA were complete by FY2005.  Construction on the secondary 
fence restarted in August 2008.34 
 
Figure 3.   Sandia Fence in San Diego Sector 
Apprehensions in fenced areas declined each year from 1992 to 2003, suggesting 
a sustained and increasing deterrent effect (Table 3).  It is impossible to evaluate the 
effect of the primary fence precisely, because apprehension data is not available for these 
                                                 
34  Leslie Berestein, "Border Fence Across Deep Canyon Will Begin to be Built Next Month," The San 
Diego Union-Tribune, 7 May 2008, 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080507/news_1n7gulch.html (accessed 20 August 2008). 
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two border stations prior to 1992.  However, according to US Border Patrol officials, the 
decision to construct the fence was a response to sharply increasing apprehensions.35  
Therefore, we can attribute the 10% average annual reduction in apprehensions between 
1992 and 1995 to the fence and staff increases, although we cannot disaggregate the 
effects of those two factors, since staffing was growing from at least 1993.  This suggests 
the primary fence did in fact aid in reversing the trend of illegal migration, but it is 
unclear to what extent.  It is clear from the available evidence that the deterrent became 
stronger after 1995.  Between 1995 and 2002 apprehensions fell at an average annual rate 
of 32%, before becoming essentially flat between 2002 and 2004.  This new trend 
coincided with the launch of Operation Gatekeeper, and preceded the initiation of 
construction of the Sandia fence.  Gatekeeper increased resources across the sector, 
providing necessary equipment and additional law enforcement agents.  While the new 
equipment was designed to enhance intrusion detection, the additional law enforcement 
agents improved the human barrier that was deployed in concert with the physical barrier.  
Between 1993 and 1997, the number of agents grew at an average annual rate of 19%, 
more than doubling in size, while apprehensions dropped 70%.  Construction on the 
Sandia fence began in 1999 and continued through 2005, averaging 1.5 miles per year.  It 
is impossible to evaluate the impact of the Sandia fence precisely, but it is important to 
note that as the fence went up, law enforcement agents from San Diego were being 
reassigned to other sectors.  The fact that apprehensions went up slightly in the unfenced 
areas but not in the fenced areas as staffing declined suggests that the reduction in 
staffing levels were being offset by the combined effects of the primary and Sandia 
fences. 
FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 
361,125 321,560 294,766 261,726 186,392 95,669 88,480 43,059 39,268 25,107 14,485 14,763 19,035 
Table 3.   Apprehensions in Fenced Areas of the San Diego Sector, 1992-2004 
Apprehensions in fenced areas did jump in 2004.  This may be a result of the 
more radical decline in staffing in that year, or of broader trends unrelated to border 
                                                 
35  Jason Ciliberti, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent, Authorized USBP Personnel on SW Border by 
Sector and Fiscal Year. 
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policing -- apprehensions in fenced San Diego and along the SW border as a whole 
increased by about 20% -- or both.  While the number of apprehensions rose, the San 
Diego sector nevertheless remained at 11-12% of border apprehensions.  Overall, 
apprehensions in the fenced areas of San Diego fell by a staggering 95% between 1992 
and 2004.  By comparison, apprehensions in unfenced areas during this same period fell 
by only 41%, while apprehensions in the other eight border sectors were up by 48%.  In 
1992 the ratio of apprehensions in unfenced to fenced areas of San Diego was 1 to 1.8 
(Figure 7).  By 1997, when manning peaked, the ratio had reversed to 2:1, and by 2004 
the ratio was 6:1, despite a sector-wide reduction in staffing levels.  This would indicate 
the security measures in the fenced areas were a more effective deterrent over the “human 
barrier” strategy in the unfenced areas, but that enhanced border patrol in unfenced San 
Diego also presented a much more effective deterrent than was the norm for the border as 
a whole. 
D. CONCLUSION 
While it is clear from the above analysis that the security measures implemented 
in San Diego had a dramatic positive impact on illegal immigration in that sector, it is 
important to take note of the fact that they had an almost equally negative impact on the 
rest of the SW border.  Most illegal migrants were diverted east from San Diego, rather 
than prevented from entering the U.S. entirely (Figure 4).  Arrests in the neighboring El 
Centro sector were 30,058 in 1993, compared to 531,689 in San Diego.  By 1999 
apprehensions in El Centro surpassed those in San Diego.  Further to the east in the 
Tucson sector, the results were even more striking.  There, apprehensions jumped from 
92,639 in 1993 to 490,771 in 2004.  Between 1992 and 2004, San Diego and Tucson 
essentially changed places, as the former dropped from 44% of total apprehensions to 
12%, and the latter increased from 8% to 43%.  This would suggest that illegal 
immigrants perceived the Tucson sector to be less secure, and thus a more permissive 
environment for illegal migration. 
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It is also important to note that staffing levels increased significantly in every 
sector of the border between 1993 and 2004, with the largest increase in Tucson.  Indeed, 
between 1993 and 2004 staffing in San Diego increased by 66%, while staffing in the 
other eight border sectors increased by 220%.   In Tucson the increase was an even more 
dramatic 633%.  However, this represented an increase from roughly 1 agent per mile to 
8 agents per mile.  Similarly, staffing in El Paso grew from roughly 2 agents per mile to 4 
agents per mile.  The entire SW border (excluding San Diego) increased from an average 
density of 1 agent per mile in 1993 to 4 agents per mile in 2004.  Thus, nowhere did the 
density of border patrol come anywhere near to that in San Diego, which was 15 agents 
per mile in 1993 and 27 agents per mile in 2004. 36  As a result, the additional manpower 
did not create an effective deterrent, and migrants simply shifted from San Diego to other 
areas along the border.   To underscore this point, consider the unfenced portion of the 
San Diego sector and the Tucson sector.  The former was able to achieve a partial 
deterrent despite the absence of a border fence given its sizeable contingent of border 
patrol agents.  The latter, on the other hand, was unable to create the necessary deterrent 
given its larger area of operation, where its forces were thinly spread.  
                                                 
36 The density level (agents per mile) is a rough indicator of the amount of law enforcement in a given 
sector.  These numbers are further divided on three 8-hour shifts, which would extend the distance each 












Unfenced 204,456 210,129 155,386 262,505 297,423 189,321 160,781 140,640 113,866 85,815 87,195 96,752 119,293
Fenced 361,125 321,560 294,766 261,726 186,392 95,669 88,480 43,059 39,268 25,107 14,485 14,763 19,035
FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 
 





Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
San Diego, CA  531,689 450,152 524,231 483,815 283,889 248,092 182,267 151,681 110,075 100,681 111,515 138,608 
EL Centro, CA  30,058 27,654 37,317 66,873 146,210 226,695 225,279 238,126 172,852 108,273 92,099 74,467 
Yuma, AZ  23,548 21,211 20,894 28,310 30,177 76,195 93,388 108,747 78,385 42,654 56,638 98,060 
Tucson, AZ  92,639 139,473 227,529 305,348 272,397 387,406 470,449 616,346 449,675 333,648 347,263 490,771 
EL Paso, TX  285,781 79,688 110,971 145,929 124,376 125,035 110,857 115,696 112,857 94,154 88,816 104,399 
Marfa, TX  15,486 13,494 11,552 13,214 12,692 14,509 14,952 13,689 12,087 11,392 10,319 10,530 
Del Rio, TX  42,289 50,036 76,490 121,137 113,280 131,058 156,653 157,178 104,875 66,985 50,145 53,794 
Laredo, TX  82,348 73,142 93,305 131,841 141,893 103,433 114,004 108,973 87,068 82,095 70,521 74,706 
McAllen, TX  109,048 124,251 169,101 210,553 243,793 204,257 169,151 133,243 107,843 89,927 77,749 92,947 
Total Southwest 1,212,886 979,101 1,271,390 1,507,020 1,368,707 1,516,680 1,537,000 1,643,679 1,235,717 929,809 905,065 1,138,282
             
% Apprehensions 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
San Diego, CA  44% 46% 41% 32% 21% 16% 12% 9% 9% 11% 12% 12% 
EL Centro, CA  2% 3% 3% 4% 11% 15% 15% 14% 14% 12% 10% 7% 
Yuma, AZ  2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 5% 6% 7% 6% 5% 6% 9% 
Tucson, AZ  8% 14% 18% 20% 20% 26% 31% 37% 36% 36% 38% 43% 
EL Paso, TX  24% 8% 9% 10% 9% 8% 7% 7% 9% 10% 10% 9% 
Marfa, TX  1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Del Rio, TX  3% 5% 6% 8% 8% 9% 10% 10% 8% 7% 6% 5% 
Laredo, TX  7% 7% 7% 9% 10% 7% 7% 7% 7% 9% 8% 7% 
McAllen, TX  9% 13% 13% 14% 18% 13% 11% 8% 9% 10% 9% 8% 
Table 4.   Apprehension Data Itemized by Sector, Year and Expressed as a Percentage of 
SW Border Total37 
                                                 
37  From "U.S. Border Patrol Apprehension Statistics 1993 – 2004," 




1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Del Rio Sector 297 299 399 406 471 589 639 758 893 972 950 933 
El Paso Sector 608 643 746 841 918 972 957 1,036 1,086 1,122 1,188 1,094 
Laredo Sector 353 337 421 415 451 628 685 806 921 969 1,025 981 
Marfa Sector 134 128 133 134 135 164 144 196 194 253 230 239 
Rio Grande 393 392 474 507 760 1,107 1,166 1,368 1,451 1,484 1,524 1,439 
El Centro 198 194 190 189 249 383 423 502 589 683 755 734 
San Diego 992 1290 1433 1,965 2,281 2,274 2,136 2,053 2,004 1,807 1,972 1,651 
Yuma 182 182 185 174 175 227 228 313 323 323 358 331 
Tucson 287 282 407 702 875 1,013 1,328 1,548 1,686 1,626 1,838 2,104 
Total 3444 3747 4388 5,333 6,315 7,357 7,706 8,580 9,147 9,239 9,840 9,506 
Table 5.   Authorized USBP Personnel on SW Border By Sector and Fiscal Year38 
 
 
                                                 
38  From Jason Ciliberti, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent, Authorized USBP Personnel on SW Border 
by Sector and Fiscal Year. 
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III. THE GAZA FENCE AND THE EVOLVING NATURE OF 
TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nations around the world have experimented with physical barriers to restrict the 
movement of terrorists in order to discourage, delay or disrupt their ability to strike 
interior targets (e.g. schools, hospitals, public common areas).  France experienced some 
success in the 1950s when it constructed a fence, complete with minefield, in Tunisia to 
separate members of the Algerian Liberation Army from their own area of operation in 
Algeria.39  More recently, Israel has built a fence surrounding the Gaza Strip and is now 
in the process of building another separation barrier along the West Bank in an attempt to 
restrict the flow of terrorists from the occupied territories. The Gaza fence has been 
repeatedly cited as a successful barrier to terrorism, a claim that was central to Israel’s 
justification of the separation barrier currently being built along the West Bank.40  
Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on the number of terrorists that have successfully 
breached/bypassed the Gaza fence in a given year.  As a result, it is not possible to 
measure the effect of the Gaza fence on terrorism directly.  In addition, the intentions of 
terrorists groups are influenced by a myriad of factors (e.g. conditions on the ground, 
political developments, and international involvement) that are independent of the Gaza 
fence.  Consequently, it is impossible to know if a temporary lull in attacks from Gaza in 
the late 1990s was a result of the defensive features of the fence or other factors, such as 
the ongoing peace negotiations.  Similarly, the skyrocketing of terrorist violence across 
Israel with the onset of the second intifada in September 2000 was associated with a 
dramatic increase in motivation to commit terrorist attacks, and this change in conditions 
masks the impact of the fence – whether positive, zero, or negative -- on the level of 
                                                 
39  Frisch Hillel, "(the) Fence Or Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of "the Fence" in Judea and 
Samaria," Democracy and Security 3 (2007), 1-19, http://www.routledge.com/ (accessed May 2008). 
40  Frisch Hillel, "(the) Fence Or Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of "the Fence" in Judea and 
Samaria," Democracy and Security 3 (2007), 1-19, http://www.routledge.com/ (accessed May 2008).; Nurit 
Kliot and Igal Charney, "The Geography of Suicide Terrorism in Israel," GeoJournal 66 (2006).; David 
Makovsky, "How to Build a Fence," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), 50. 
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terrorism. Existing analyses by the Israeli government and the Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC) 
argues among other things that the Gaza fence has played an integral role in reducing the 
number of Israelis killed by acts of terrorism.41  Yet, these reports begin their analysis in 
September 2000, the start of the second intifada and five years after the fence was 
completed.  This methodological problem skews their analysis.  What’s more, these 
analyses do not take into account adaptation and innovation of terrorist organizations.  
These reports discount the growing threat of indirect fire weapons (e.g. rockets, mortars) 
as well as the labyrinth of clandestine tunnels as a means of covert infiltration.  While 
these means of attack/infiltration are still in their infancy and account for a small 
percentage of those killed by terrorists, their use is growing rapidly, which challenges the 
conventional wisdom on the effectiveness of the security fence. 
B. THE GAZA FENCE 
The Gaza fence was built in 1995, completely partitioning Gaza from Israel.  It 
stretches along 45 kilometers of flat terrain void of any natural barriers between the two 
areas.42  The Gaza Strip is a small, but strategic, landmass (approximately 360 square 
kilometers) connecting Africa and the Middle East, which was occupied by the Israeli 
Army following the 1967 War.43  In 2005, Israel withdrew its settlers and military forces 
after a long and costly occupation.  The area is now under the control of the Palestinian 
                                                 
41 Unless otherwise stated, the information in this chapter comes from the following sources:  Anti-
Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data Analysis and Trends (Israel: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 
at Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC),[2007]), http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/terrorism_2006e.pdf (accessed  24 September 2008).; 
Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008 (Israel: Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center at Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC),[2008]), http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/terror_07e.pdf (accessed  24 September 2008).; Israel's 
Anti-Terrorist Fence: An Overview (Israel: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[2008]), 
http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/Data/48152.doc (accessed  2 October 2008).; "The Anti-Terrorism 
Fence: Facts and Figures (PowerPoint)," State of Israel, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/11/Saving+Lives-+Israel-
s+Security+Fence.htm (accessed  Oct 16, 2008). 
42  Frisch Hillel, "(the) Fence Or Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of "the Fence" in Judea and 
Samaria," Democracy and Security 3 (2007), 1-19, http://www.routledge.com/ (accessed May 2008). 
43  "Zionist Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza," The Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs 21, no. 9 (Dec, 2002), 90 (accessed 15 October 2008). 
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Authority (PA), in accordance with the Oslo Accords of 1993.44  It is currently home to 
nearly 1.5 million Palestinians, making it one of the most densely populated places on 
earth.45  The population is very young with a median age of 16 years, and a population 
growth rate of 3.6%.  Nearly 35% of the population is unemployed and 80% lives below 
the poverty line.  In addition, one million Palestinians—or 2/3 of the population—are 
internally displaced.46  Gross Domestic Product per capita is approximately $1,100, 
compared to more than $25,800 in Israel.47  Palestinian officials maintain that the fence 
has had a significant adverse impact on the economy and exacerbated poor economic 
conditions in the area.  Thus, the fence not only separates Arab from Jew, but “haves” 
from “have nots.”  These combined factors make the Gaza Strip an ideal breeding ground 
for terrorism.48 
In the seven years prior to the construction of the Gaza fence in 1995, the level of 
terrorism in Israel—as measured by the total number of Israelis killed—averaged 38 
persons per year.49  The average climbed slightly to 39 in the six years following 
construction, suggesting no direct effect of the fence on terrorism related deaths.  Since 
the onset of the second intifada in September 2000 the average has been 153, but 
declining steadily from 452 in the peak year 2002 to 13 in 2007 (Figure 5).  It is virtually 
impossible to determine what effect, if any, the fence had after violence spiked.  It could 
be that without the fence the number of terrorist attacks would have been even higher, or 
                                                 
44  Seth Orkand, "Coming Apart at the Seamline--the Oslo Accords and Israel's Security at the 
International Court of Justice and the Israeli Supreme Court," Gonzaga Journal of International Law 10:3, 
no. 391 (Spring, 2007), 406, http://www.gonzagajil.org/pdf/volume10/Orkand/Orkand.pdf (accessed 1 
October 2008). 
45  David Margolis, "Denseness Over Density," The Jerusalem Report (August 23, 2004), 47. 
46  "The World Fact Book: The Gaza Strip," Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html (accessed  September 25, 2008). 
47  "The World Fact Book: Israel," Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html (accessed  October 7, 2008). 
48  Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, "Some Roots of Terrorism," Population and Environment 24, no. 
2 (November 2002), 183. 
49 These numbers include all of Israel and the occupied territories. "Fatalities in Palestinian Terror 
Attacks since 1967," Jewish Virtual Library, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/osloterr.html (accessed September 2008). 
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that the number would have been lower in the absence of the adverse economic impact of 
the fence on the Gaza population, or that the number would have been the same.  In 
addition, associating terrorist incidents with the protective features of the Gaza fence is 
very difficult.  A suicide bomber departing from the West Bank to attack a crowded 
market place in Tel Aviv can be assumed to be entirely unaffected by a separation barrier 
located outside of his or her route of travel.  However, an attack against Israeli soldiers 
located in Gaza (before the occupation ended in 2005) may indicate a deterrent effect of 
the fence, since it occurred in Gaza rather than Israel.  Yet even in this scenario it is 
impossible to know all the factors that influenced the terrorists strike, and therefore 
difficult to draw any conclusions without information about the intentions and planning 
factors of the terror groups conducting the attack.  Similarly, while there appears to have 
been a general decline in terrorism between 1996 and 1999, which might be attributed to 
the fence, it is impossible to isolate this potential effect from that of other factors, 
especially the ongoing political negotiations.  Overall, while the available evidence is 
inconclusive, it certainly calls into question the claimed counter-terror contribution of the 
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Figure 5.   Number of Israelis Killed by Acts of Terrorism, 1988-200750 
                                                 
50 In 1993 38 were killed before the Oslo Agreement, and 26 were killed after the Oslo Agreement.  
These attacks could have occurred in Israel or the occupied territories.  These numbers include all of Israel 
and the occupied territories.  From "Fatalities in Palestinian Terror Attacks since 1967," Jewish Virtual 
Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/osloterr.html (accessed September 2008). 
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C. ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION 
There have been several publicly reported incidents of Palestinian terrorists 
breaching the Gaza fence directly during periods of elevated hostilities.  In 2002, during 
the height of the second intifada, Hamas terrorists infiltrated through the Gaza fence into 
Israel to conduct military strikes against Israeli forces.51  In 2005 terrorist again breached 
the perimeter in two separate incidents to conduct similar attacks.52  Israelis were killed 
and military equipment destroyed.  These operations suggest that terrorists are capable of 
bypassing the security features of the Gaza fence when sufficiently motivated to do so, 
though without data on failed breaches it is impossible to evaluate how effectively they 
have done so.   
More significant that these isolated cases of breaching the fence, is the increase in 
the use of alternative means of attack.  Hamas and other terrorist networks responded to 
the Gaza fence by creating simple but effective ways to get around it in an effort to 
marginalize its effectiveness.  These adaptations included firing rockets (and mortars) 
over the fence and digging tunnels under the fence.  Scholars refer to this sort of 
innovation as the substitution effect.53  As governments tighten security in one area (e.g. 
construct border fences), terrorist groups strike elsewhere or in a new manner that is more 
adapted to the new array of vulnerabilities.  Rockets and mortars have enabled terrorist 
groups to continue their campaign against Israel, side-stepping the border entry problem.  
Tunnels have become another way to get around the fence.  These tunnels—secretly 
connecting Gaza to the Sinai (Egypt) and Israel—are extremely complex and intricate.  
Terrorist organizations have used them to rearm through Egypt and strike at targets 
                                                 
51  Frisch Hillel, "(the) Fence Or Offense? Testing the Effectiveness of "the Fence" in Judea and 
Samaria," Democracy and Security 3 (2007), 1-19, http://www.routledge.com/ (accessed May 2008). 
52  "Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel since the Declaration of Principles (September 
1993)," Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Suicide+and+Other+Bombing+Attacks+in+Israel+Sin
ce.htm (accessed September 2008). 
53  Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. "What do we Know about the Substitution Effect in 
Transnational Terrorism? "Alabama, California, http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~tsandler/substitution2ms.pdf 
(accessed October 7, 2008). 
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within Israel.  The combination of these new tactics indicates important adaptations to the 
Gaza fence that limit its effectiveness. 
The combination of the fence and the withdrawal of IDF forces from Gaza in 
2005 made rockets and mortars the “weapon of choice.”54  These rockets have a small 
warhead, are fairly inaccurate, and have a range of only approximately 6 miles.  
However, their advantage is that Qassam rockets are low tech devices that can easily be 
manufactured in Gaza.  They have transformed the campaign against Israel from the 
relative safety of the Gaza Strip, now under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Authority.55  Hamas’ first rocket attack occurred in April 2001 and since that time 
thousands of rockets/mortars have fallen on Israel from Gaza (Figure 7).56  The 
occupation limited the growth of this new type of attacks as long as it lasted because the 
IDF was trained and equipped to quickly detect and respond to indirect fire.  Once launch 
is detected, it was able to identify the rocket’s point of origin and dispatch forces to that 
location in hopes of capturing the terrorist.  Hamas achieved some operational success in 
2004 when it surged its rocket/mortar campaign, resulting in the first rocket-related 
fatalities.57  Four Israelis were killed, but more than 130 Palestinian operatives were 
killed by the IDF response.58  As a result, rocket/mortar attacks dropped back to the 2003 
level in 2005, and grew significantly only after the IDF withdrawal.  The total number of 
Israelis killed by terrorist attacks of all kinds dropped from 452 in 2002, the peak of the 
second intifada, to 13 in 2007.  During this same period, the number of rockets/mortars 
fired from Gaza shot up from 292 to 1,645.  Between 2004 and 2007, a total of 204 
                                                 
54  Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008, 26. 
55  Leslie Susser, "Answering the Qassams," The Jerusalem Report, sec. Israel, July 26, 2004 
(accessed Oct 10, 2008). 




57  "Qassam Rocket," GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-
qassam.htm (accessed December 3, 2008). 
58  Ibid. 
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Israelis were killed.  Of that 204, only 16 (or 12.75%) were killed due to indirect fire.59  
This suggests that while terrorist were able to adapt to the fence and innovate tactically, 
their new tactics have not yet proven as effective as the earlier ones.  In other words, 








Rockets 4 35 155 281 179 946 896 1,087
Mortors 245 257 265 876 238 22 749 1,218
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
Figure 6.   Mortar and Rocket Attacks from Gaza, 2001-200860 
However, rockets/mortars have had a demoralizing effect on communities within 
their flight path disproportionate to their destructive impact.  The people of Sderot and 
surrounding communities have been affected by persistent rocket fire from the Gaza Strip 
(Figure 5).  In this way, they may feel more terrorized.  In 2004, the mayor of the small 
border town expressed great concern over the increasing rocket fire and its influence on 
the citizens in that town, concluding: “if Sderot becomes a ghost town, the terrorists will 
                                                 
59  Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data Analysis and Trends; Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its 
Trends in 2008. 
60  From The Hamas Terror War Against Israel. 
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have won a greater victory than they ever dreamed of.”61  An excerpt taken from a 
government website characterized these attacks this way: 
Rocket and mortar shell fire is relatively less lethal than suicide bombing 
attacks but has a devastating effect on the daily life and sense of security 
of the 200,000 residents of the western Negev.  The damage done by 
rockets to the civilian population of Sderot and other western Negev 
population centers cannot be measured only statistically in terms of dead 
and wounded.  Studies done in recent years showed that the continued 
rocket fire and the large number of shock victims have led to post 
traumatic stress disorder among many of Sderot's residents (close to 30%).  
It influences their mental health and seriously damages the quality of their 
lives.62 
While the town of Sderot has been the target of nearly half of all rocket/mortar attacks, 
other communities have also been affected.  The town of Ashkelon has been a target of 
more advanced rockets with a slightly longer range.  In May 2008, a Grad rocket hit a 
busy shopping mall, resulting in the injury of 90 innocent civilians.63  As more advanced 
rockets flow into Gaza, rockets that can travel a greater distance will threaten a growing 
number of Israeli communities.  Hamas has already achieved some operational success in 
Sderot and Ashkelon, and will likely refine their manufacturing techniques to improve 
their payload and range.  With each passing day the Gaza fence becomes less relevant. 
 
                                                 
61  Leslie Susser, "Answering the Qassams," The Jerusalem Report, sec. Israel, 26 July, 2004 
(accessed October 10, 2008). 
62  The Hamas Terror War Against Israel. 
63  Ibid. 
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Figure 7.   Israeli communities within Range of Rocket Fire from Gaza64 
Tunnels are everywhere in Gaza, bypassing the security features of the fence and 
normal customs controls.  It is not clear how many tunnels currently exist.  Between 2000 
and 2003 more than 100 tunnels connecting Gaza and Egypt were reportedly destroyed 
by the IDF.65  They were primarily used to smuggle goods and equipment from Egypt to 
Gaza, and have become crucial to the resupply efforts necessary for offensive operations 
against Israel. Between 2005 and 2006 the illicit importation of explosives was estimated 
to have increased from 6 tons to 28 tons, rifles increased from 9,300 to 14,000 and 
ammunition increased from 2 millions to 5 million rounds.  More advanced weapons 
have also been reported to be moving through these tunnels as part of a military buildup 
in Gaza, including Russian- and Egyptian-made rockets and anti-tank weapons, which are 
increasingly jeopardizing Israeli forces.  In 2007 an Israeli government report 
                                                 
64  From The Hamas Terror War Against Israel. 
65  Almog, Doron Major General, "Lessons of the Gaza Security Fence for the West Bank," Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-12.htm (accessed September 23, 2008). 
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acknowledged that the IDF discovered and destroyed an additional 13 such tunnels.  In 
mid-2008 the number of tunnels linking Gaza to Egypt and Israel was estimated to be in 
the hundreds (Figure 7).66   
Tunnels have also been used in conjunction with high explosives to destroy Israeli 
equipment and infrastructure.  On several occasions, Hamas terrorists tunneled beneath 
IDF outposts and detonated high explosives in order to destroy fortifications and 
infrastructure.67  Terrorist have also been known to use these tunnels in the course of 
infiltration operations into Israel to conduct direct attacks.  In 2007, terrorists conducted a 
high-profile attack by entering into Israel through a tunnel approximately 800 meters 
long.  They conducted a surreptitious attack against IDF forces, killing two and wounding 
three.  The attackers destroyed two armored vehicles and an observation post, before 
abducting an IDF soldier and retreating through a hole in the Gaza fence.  These types of 
operations go a long way to undermine the faith and confidence of the Israeli people in 
the effectiveness of the Gaza fence.  The operational successes achieved through the use 
of tunnels embolden terrorist to use them in future operations.  However, despite the 
widespread use of tunnels, terrorist-related fatalities continue to drop.  Tunnels, like 
rockets/mortars, have not been associated with a significant number of deaths to date, but 
may prove important in some future uprising.  
                                                 
66  "Gaza Tunnels 'Become an Industry'," BBC, sec. Middle East, 16 October, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7673926.stm (accessed October 28, 2008). 
67  Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993); 
"Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000," Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism (accessed October 8, 2008). 
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Figure 8.   Tunnels Connecting Gaza and Egypt68 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Gaza fence has been viewed by many in the Israeli government as a success 
in terms of restricting the flow of terrorists into Israel.  However, it is unclear what 
operational success the fence has actually had. The ability to infiltrate into Israel may (or 
may not) have been reduced, but terrorist groups have adjusted to the new environment.  
Ironically, the Gaza fence encouraged terrorist groups to go underground: literally to dig 
and use subterranean tunnels as a means of smuggling equipment and operatives into and 
out of the Gaza Strip.  The combination of the Gaza fence and the withdrawal of the IDF 
similarly led to the widespread use of indirect fire weapons such as rockets/mortars by 
groups such as Hamas.  Yet these innovations have yet to achieve any significant increase 
in the number of Israeli fatalities.  As the number of rocket/mortar strikes increased, the 
overall number of fatalities decreased, suggesting a reduced terrorist capability. 
 
                                                 
68  From Gaza Tunnels 'Become an Industry.' 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the San Diego fence suggests that fencing can be an effective 
deterrent to illegal immigration, in coordination with other border security tools.  The 
initial primary fence had little impact on the level of illegal immigration, but as more 
agents were introduced and capture became more likely the number of illegal border 
crossings declined dramatically.  The analysis of the Gaza fence was not able to establish 
whether or how much of an effect that fence had on the level of terrorism, but was able to 
establish a clear pattern of adaption by terrorists.  As soon as the Gaza fence went up, 
excavation on the tunnels began.  These tunnels enhanced weapons smuggling and 
terrorist infiltration operations, and spurred the importation and local manufacture of 
indirect fire weapons that could deliver high explosives over the fence.   
Before the implications of these findings for the likely efficacy of the new U.S. 
border fence can be identified, several fundamental contextual differences need to be 
taken into account.  First, the San Diego fence was partial, and the Gaza fence total.  The 
partial San Diego fence directed illegal migration away from the San Diego sector when 
combined with the proper staffing levels of USBP, but only by shifting illegal migration 
to less secure areas of the border.  Thus, while fencing and staffing increases achieved a 
very large effect locally, they did nothing to reduce illegal immigration across the border 
overall, since aliens simply went around the fence.  In contrast, the Gaza fence provided 
100% containment, and produced much more dramatic innovations by those effectively 
enclosed by it.  The different responses to the two fences may be largely attributable to 
the partial versus comprehensive nature of the fences. Terrorists operating in Gaza had 
little choice but to innovate.  Illegal aliens attempting to enter the U.S. were not forced to 
innovate, because they had the easier alternative of going around the partial fence.  Had 
the circumstances been reversed, there may have been more tunneling in the US and less 
tunneling and fewer rocket/mortar attacks in Gaza.   
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Secondly, the two border regions vary dramatically in the permissiveness of the 
environment, with potentially significant implications for how terrorists are deterred.  
Israel and Gaza have a long and troubled past, with limited economic interdependence.  
The Israel-Gaza border is a non-permissive environment, akin to a demilitarized zone.  
Israeli security forces take offensive actions and terrorists operating in that border-region 
are therefore under greater pressure to conceal their efforts.  They run the risk of getting 
shot or killed upon detection, thus jeopardizing their larger mission.  The United States 
and Mexico, on the other hand, are on friendly terms with one another and share 
enormous economic interests.  Their border region is a permissive operating area, where 
violence is rare despite frequent border incursions.  Terrorist operating on the U.S.-
Mexican border could more easily exploit its permissive environment.  The USBP takes 
all suspects into custody on the initial presumption that they are migrant workers.  They 
do not fire their weapons unless seriously provoked.  When an arrested illegal border 
crosser does not appear to be Mexican or Central American, further investigation by U.S. 
authorities takes place after arrest and before release.  If the border crosser is in fact a 
would-be terrorist or can be linked to terrorist’s network, this could result in U.S. 
intelligence that preempts the intended attack.  Thus, despite the different levels of 
permissiveness, terrorists’ calculations may actually be may be more similar than 
different.  They are likely to use risk mitigation strategies at both the U.S.-Mexican and 
Israeli-Gaza borders to minimize their exposure and preserve mission integrity.  
Third, the border patrol strategies in Gaza and San Diego were dramatically 
different.  Up to 2005, the Israeli border patrol strategy focused on using aggressive 
military tactics on the both sides of the fence.  The military occupation of the Gaza Strip 
was able to contain terrorism, reducing its frequency and effect.  The withdrawal of 
Israeli forces in 2005 from that area hastened the use of rockets and mortars and the use 
of subterranean tunnels.  By contrast, the San Diego border patrol strategy relied upon 
civil policing tactics on the U.S. side of the border exclusively.  It entailed deploying 
border agents—in concert with high-tech sensors—along frequently traveled routes.  
These sensors could detect groups of illegal immigrants more precisely and efficiently 
vector agents to their position, resulting in their arrest.  These different strategies 
 37
reflected the different goals of the two fences: deterring small numbers of would-be 
terrorists versus deterring large numbers of illegal migrant workers.  The patrol strategy 
in each case was the appropriate one for the specific objective.  The superficial 
implications of this finding would be that if the objective of the new U.S. border fence is 
to deter both illegal migrant workers and terrorists, then it would need to adopt the a 
hybrid of the San Diego and Gaza strategies.  However, militarization of the friendly and 
permissive environment on the U.S.-Mexico border would clearly create more problems 
that it solved. 
With all of these caveats, it is reasonable to conclude based on the analysis of San 
Diego and Gaza that both illegal migrants and terrorist are likely to adapt to the new 
fence.  They can be expected to shift to unfenced areas of the border where the fewest 
number of agents guard the international divide, marking the path of least resistance.  
These tend to be remote areas that are difficult to get to on foot.  However, in these areas 
sensors such as cameras and ground radars will provide enhanced indications and 
warnings of illegal border crossings, and facilitate a high rate of capture, despite the 
absence of a fence.  To the extent that border patrol proves an effective dragnet in the 
gaps in the new fence, illegal aliens and terrorists can be expected to employ strategies to 
marginalize the effects of the new border fence in other ways.  That would likely involve 
digging networks of tunnels to bypass the complex layered defense of physical barriers, 
sensors and border patrol agents. 
 It is for these reasons that the issue of border patrol is critical.  The lessons from 
San Diego suggest that the fence achieved its intended effect when the number of border 
agents was sufficient to respond to the vast influx of illegal aliens.  In the case of San 
Diego, that figure hovered around 27 agents per mile.  The Tucson sector, despite its 
enormous increase from 1 agent per mile to 8 agents per mile, did not achieve a sufficient 
level to deter illegal immigrants in that sector; these agents were simply dispersed too far 
apart.  The Gaza fence also indicated the importance of effective border patrol in 
conjunction with the fence—in this case the IDF.  As a result, some new approach is 
therefore needed; one that mixes the lessons-learned of San Diego and Gaza, where  
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policing strategies and techniques can be fashioned in a more effective manner to respond 
to the divergent challenges of illegal immigration and terrorism along the U.S.-Mexican 
border. 
The research conducted for this thesis was ultimately unable to answer the 
research question reliably, and thus the likely impact of the new fence on both illegal 
immigration and terrorism remains unknown.  However, it is clear from this research that 
effect of the new border fence will be closely tied to establishing and maintaining a 
sufficient cadre of border patrol agents on both sides of the border.  For the United States, 
that entails fostering a closer relationship to Mexico to focus greater attention on 
conducting operations from their side of the border to deter/detect illegal immigration and 
pending acts of terrorism.  Further research is therefore needed on what that cooperation 
may look like and consider legal, organizational and doctrinal aspects, before a final 
conclusion can be reached on the likely effectiveness of the new U.S. border fence. 
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